From a new supercarrier to high-risk encounters with foreign ships, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has just completed one of its most consequential years yet. The pace of shipbuilding remains intense, yet 2025 was less about laying keels and more about testing whether China’s vast surface fleet can operate like a true blue‑water navy.
Fujian’s debut and the shadow of a nuclear carrier
The single clearest symbol of China’s naval ambitions in 2025 was the commissioning of the aircraft carrier Fujian (18). The ceremony took place on 5 November at Yulin naval base on Hainan Island, in the South China Sea.
With three active carriers, China now sits firmly as the world’s second carrier power, though still trailing the United States by a wide margin.
Fujian is not just another carrier hull. It is China’s first “supercarrier” with electromagnetic catapults, a technology previously fielded only by the US Navy. Catapults allow heavier aircraft – including airborne early warning planes and more fully loaded fighters – to operate from the deck, sharply improving combat range and flexibility.
After commissioning, Fujian conducted shakedown activity, including a move from Hainan to the Yellow Sea. By mid‑December, the ship was berthed at Yuchi naval base, alongside China’s first carrier, Liaoning (16). The two carriers moored together offered a visual snapshot of the PLAN’s rapid evolution from refitted Soviet hull to indigenous supercarrier within little more than a decade.
Type 004: a nuclear carrier emerging in Dalian
While Fujian draws attention, analysts are fixated on a partly built hull at Dalian Shipbuilding in northern China. The structure’s size, layout and distinctive openings – believed to be reactor compartments – have led most observers to conclude it is the country’s first nuclear‑powered carrier, informally dubbed Type 004.
The suspected Type 004 taking shape at Dalian would mark China’s shift from imitating foreign carriers to fielding a truly long‑range, nuclear strike platform.
Dalian played a central role in China’s carrier story, refitting Liaoning and building the conventionally powered Shandong (17). Now, the same drydock appears to host a more ambitious project. A nuclear carrier would give the PLAN sustained endurance far from home waters, closer to American carrier capabilities.
Washington is watching closely. The US Department of Defense’s latest China military report floated the possibility that Beijing could produce six additional carriers by 2035. To reach anything near that number, shipyards at Dalian and Jiangnan would need to work in parallel, likely mixing conventional and nuclear designs.
➡️ If the ATM keeps your card, this fast technique instantly retrieves it before help arrives
➡️ Why China’s high-speed rail is now outpacing the French model
➡️ This old French château hides a medieval tunnel system discovered accidentally during renovation
➡️ If you feel tense before relaxing, psychology explains the nervous system shift
➡️ This new plane looks like a giant wing, wants to reinvent air travel, and promises 30% less fuel
Hints from Wuhan’s carrier mock‑up
An often overlooked indicator sits hundreds of miles inland: the full‑scale carrier mock‑up in Wuhan, used for deck layout and sensor testing. In 2025 it underwent major changes, including a more compact island set further aft, reminiscent of the US Ford‑class design.
Curiously, the updated mock‑up still shows a large funnel, inconsistent with a nuclear carrier, which would not need such exhausts. That detail has led some analysts to suggest that Jiangnan shipyard could be planning a second, improved conventionally powered carrier similar in philosophy to Fujian, while Dalian pursues nuclear propulsion with Type 004.
The Wuhan test facility points to ongoing experimentation: China appears unwilling to bet everything on a single carrier concept.
For now, there is no hard sign of a new carrier build at Jiangnan. That absence leaves big questions for 2026 and beyond.
Type 076: the drone-friendly amphibious carrier
Carriers were not the only big decks in the spotlight. On 14 November, the catapult-equipped amphibious assault ship Sichuan (51) – the first of the Type 076 line – began sea trials from Shanghai.
The 40,000‑ton ship resembles a landing helicopter dock (LHD) but adds a catapult and arresting systems, signalling a hybrid role: helicopter and landing operations alongside fixed‑wing drones and possibly light aircraft.
Type 076 blurs the line between assault ship and light carrier, offering the PLAN a flexible platform for drones, amphibious forces and air support.
Sichuan has already completed two trial periods and then entered dry dock. By late December, commercial satellite and local imagery showed at least six unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) mock‑ups nearby, echoing drone types displayed in Beijing’s autumn military parade. Whether they are for deck handling tests, fit checks or future flight operations remains unclear.
The timetable to full service is uncertain. Earlier Type 075 LHDs took more than a year between first sea trial and formal commissioning. Given the extra technical complexity of catapults, Sichuan might need even longer to reach frontline readiness.
Type 075: a quieter but steady workhorse
While Sichuan grabbed headlines, the fourth Type 075 LHD, Hubei (34), slipped into service with much less attention. The 35,000‑ton vessel moved from Hudong shipyard to Zhanjiang in January 2025 for trials and received its name and hull number around May.
What happens next is a live debate among analysts. Some expected a long run of Type 075s, mirroring the PLAN’s earlier investment in Type 071 landing platform docks. Instead, there is a pause: no new 075 or 076 hulls have been confirmed.
China may be holding back on more amphibious ships until Type 076 proves its worth at sea.
If Sichuan performs well, the navy could prioritise this more capable design, especially for drone‑heavy, high‑end operations around Taiwan or in the Western Pacific.
Destroyers: heavy firepower spreads across the fleet
2025 was a year of mass for Chinese destroyers. The second production batch of Type 055 large destroyers – classified as cruisers by the US – appears to have wrapped up with a total of six new hulls, three each from Jiangnan and Dalian. Combined with the earlier eight, the PLAN now fields 14 of these powerful ships.
Each Type 055 carries 112 vertical launch cells and advanced sensors, giving the Chinese fleet robust air defence and long‑range strike options. New footage at the end of the year showed the destroyer Wuxi (104) firing the YJ‑20 anti‑ship missile in a “type certification” test, suggesting that a new generation of long‑range naval missiles is nearing regular service.
The rollout of Type 055 and YJ‑20 underlines a clear goal: threaten enemy surface groups well beyond the first island chain.
Significantly, the Eastern Theatre Command, which faces Taiwan, appears set to receive its first Type 055s from the second batch. Earlier units were concentrated in northern and southern fleets, but Beijing now seems ready to plant its most capable surface combatants opposite the island.
Type 052D: the backbone keeps growing
Below the 055s in size but not in importance, the Type 052D class continued to multiply. Updated variants, sometimes labelled 052DM, rolled out from both Dalian and Jiangnan, with total production of the 052D family now approaching 40 hulls.
With roughly 7,000–7,500 tons displacement and 64 vertical launch cells, these destroyers form the backbone of Chinese carrier strike groups and surface action groups. By the end of 2025, at least seven or eight of the newest units had entered service.
China is also squeezing more life out of older platforms. The four Russian‑built Sovremenny destroyers, once the pride of the fleet, are undergoing extensive modernisation. Three have already emerged upgraded, suggesting the PLAN is unwilling to let overall destroyer numbers dip as new missions pile up.
- Type 055: heavy “cruiser”-style destroyer, 112 VLS cells, advanced radar
- Type 052D: workhorse air‑defence destroyer, 64 VLS cells
- Sovremenny class: older Russian-built ships, now modernised to extend utility
Frigates: a cautious step into a new generation
Frigate construction in 2025 showed a mix of progress and hesitation. Two new‑generation Type 054B frigates entered service early in the year. Luohe (545) joined the Northern Theatre Command in January, followed by Qinzhou (555) with the Southern Theatre Command.
The 054B design is intended as an upgrade over the widely exported Type 054A, with better sensors and improved hull form. Yet after those two ships, there has been no public evidence of additional 054B hulls under construction at the main yards in Guangzhou and Shanghai.
Beijing appears to be “test driving” the 054B before committing to a large production run, a pattern seen in several earlier Chinese ship classes.
Instead, shipyards carried on building the refined Type 054A variant, sometimes dubbed 054AG. That continuity has sparked speculation that the 054B might not fully meet PLAN expectations. A more cautious reading is that the navy is simply following its usual playbook: slowly validating a new design while relying on proven hulls to keep fleet numbers climbing.
Unconfirmed reports suggest orders for further 054B ships may already exist. If true, 2026 could show whether the PLAN is ready to pivot fully to the new frigate generation.
Global outings and growing pains at sea
Beyond steel and tonnage, 2025 offered a clearer picture of how China intends to use its navy.
Cruising around Australia, then back to Taiwan
Early in the year, a Chinese task group – including a Type 055 destroyer, a Type 054A frigate and a replenishment tanker – looped through the South Pacific and circumnavigated Australia, conducting live‑fire drills between Australia and New Zealand.
The Australian Defence Force monitored the Chinese flotilla closely, signalling that Beijing’s “far seas” operations are no longer theoretical.
Later in the year, Canberra reported another PLAN group on the move, this time including a Type 075 LHD. Initial assumptions pointed to a repeat cruise near Australia. Instead, the ships swung north to support a new round of live‑fire drills around Taiwan. The episode underlined a central truth: China can now pick and choose where to signal presence, from Pacific blue water to contested straits close to home.
Collision in a crowded sea
Not all operations went smoothly. On 11 August, the destroyer Guilin (164), a Type 052D, collided with a China Coast Guard offshore patrol vessel in waters contested with the Philippines. The coast guard ship, based on the small Type 056 corvette design, suffered severe bow damage; the destroyer was also visibly dented.
Both Chinese ships had been chasing a Philippine coast guard vessel that was escorting local fishing boats. The incident, captured on Philippine-released imagery, highlighted not just tensions with Manila but also the risks when two separate Chinese agencies – navy and coast guard – operate aggressively in the same tight space.
As Chinese naval and coastguard units crowd sensitive waters, the risk of miscalculation or accidental escalation rises sharply.
Guilin reappeared repaired in imagery by November. The damaged coast guard ship was moved to facilities on Hainan, though its current status is less clear.
Carrier-versus-carrier training and pressure on Japan
Another notable development was an apparent “red versus blue” style exercise between China’s two earlier carriers, Liaoning and Shandong, in June. The deployment took both groups beyond the so‑called first island chain for roughly two weeks, suggesting more ambitious scenarios that may have included simulating a US carrier opponent.
In December, Liaoning sailed near Japan with supporting warships. Japanese sources reported radar lock‑ons by Chinese J‑15 carrier fighters against Japan Air Self‑Defense Force jets, a step up from routine shadowing and a reminder that aerial brinkmanship is not limited to the South China Sea.
Key concepts and future scenarios
Several terms used to describe China’s navy can be opaque. “First island chain” refers to the arc of territory from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines down to Borneo. Chinese military planning often treats breaking beyond this line as a major milestone for power projection.
“Blue‑water navy” describes a fleet able to operate globally for extended periods. China is not yet at US levels, but the combination of new carriers, large destroyers, and growing replenishment capacity shows steady movement in that direction.
Put simply, Beijing is building a fleet designed not just to defend its coastline, but to shape events thousands of miles away.
Looking ahead, several practical scenarios are now very real for regional planners. A Taiwan crisis could see Type 076 amphibious ships launching drone swarms while Type 055 destroyers form air‑defence umbrellas for carriers. Farther afield, a dispute in the Indian Ocean or South Pacific could feature Chinese task groups sustained by overseas ports and modern supply ships.
There are also risks for China. Running a complex carrier fleet demands intensive training, strict safety culture and seamless coordination across services. The August collision and aggressive radar incidents show that the learning curve can be steep. With more ships at sea and more encounters with foreign forces, the chances of accidents and unintended clashes inevitably rise.
For neighbouring states, the 2025 picture of the PLAN forces difficult questions: how to balance deterrence and dialogue, which capabilities to prioritise, and how to manage constant contact with a navy that is both still learning and increasingly willing to assert its presence far from its own shores.